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THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM
I. FACTS
In April 1987, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney introduced the
ten Canadian provinces to the Meech Lake Accord, a proposed amendment
to the Canadian Constitution.' The proposal's key provision was the
recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society," an attempt to induce Quebec
to sign Canada's 1982 Constitution.2 Although the amendment was blocked
by only two of the provinces, Newfoundland and Manitoba, Quebecers per-
ceived the collapse of the Accord as a rebuff by the rest of the country.3
The death of the Accord in June 1990 led to the escalation of Quebec's
demands well beyond those of Meech Lake and to a round of arduous
negotiations between the first ministers in the months that followed.4
' CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982).
2 Hubert Bauch, It's Our Future: Why Don't We Care; Why Unity Talks Turn Canadians
Off, TORONTO STAR, June 29, 1992, at Al [hereinafter It's Our Future]. Quebec refused to
sign Canada's 1982 Constitution for fear its French language and way of life needed more
protection from the dominant English-speaking culture. Canadian Officials OK 'Distinct'
Status for Quebec, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 8, 1992 at A8. In pursuit of such protection,
Quebec has long sought more formal recognition as a "distinct society" within Canada.
Additionally, "Canadian native peoples, the Indians and Inuit, have become much more
aggressive in demanding similar recognition as distinct societies" since the 1990 failure of the
Meech Lake Accord. Id.; Hugh Winsor, Quebec Raises the Stakes in Row with Canada,
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 5, 1992, at 12; Joseph Devanithran, Chronology, in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 17 (Canada section) (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz
eds., 1991) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS]; Hubert Bauch, Quebec After Mulroney; National
Unity; PM's Goodbye Spells Trouble, GAzETrE (Montreal), Feb. 27, 1993, at B3 [hereinafter
Quebec After Mulroney] (noting [t]he trouble with the distinct-society concept was that
nobody could ever really define it ... Even so, a lot of Quebecers liked the sound of it..
.").
3 Winsor, supra note 2. The amendment required the ratification of all 10 provinces
before June 23, 1990.
4 It's Our Future, supra note 2; see Winsor, supra note 2; Mary Janigan, Judgment Day;
Turbulent Times Polarized the Country, MACLEAN'S, March 8, 1993, at 24. Besides formal
recognition as a distinct society, Quebec demanded protection of its territory from native
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As if to punctuate its demands for autonomy, the Quebec. provincial
legislature passed a law in June of 1991 requiring the federal government to
hold a referendum on independence by October 26, 1992.1 A federal
government proposal issued in March 1992 endorsed the recognition of
Quebec as a distinct society but was rejected by Quebec's Premier, Robert
Bourassa, in that it did not recognize Quebec's need to promote its own
social and cultural development.6 At the time of the proposal, polls in
Quebec showed support for independence stood at 50 percent.
While Quebec's Premier rejected the March proposal as offering his
province too little, English-speaking Canadian politicians attacked it for
control and more weight in the Canadian Senate. The other provinces and national leaders
wanted their own protections and to keep Quebec from getting too much control. See Edison
Stewart, PM Calls Full-Scale Conference On Unity, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 13, 1992, at A13;
Winsor, supra note 2; William Johnson, Price of Bringing Quebec to Table May Be Too
High, TORONTO STAR, July 30, 1992, at A 1l.
5 Christine Tierney, Clock Runs Down for Canada-Quebec Deal, Reuters, Mar. 10, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. A "Yes" vote in October, though, would not
have mandated the secession of the province from Canada. Robert McKenzie, It Seems
Bourassa Has Boxed Himself In, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 10, 1992, at A19. As voted through
the Quebec National Assembly, Law 150, Article 1, Chapter 1 stated that if the results of the
referendum were in favor of sovereignty, they would constitute a proposal that Quebec
acquire the status of a sovereign state one year to the day from the holding of the vote. Id.
Sovereignty is defined as "the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any
independent state is governed." BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
6 Winsor, supra note 2. Bourassa, who boycotted formal negotiations after the Meech
Lake accord, wanted the recognition to have enough legal weight to override the guarantees
accorded Quebec's English-speaking minority as enshrined in the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Id.; John Geddes, PM Pushes To Eliminate Provincial Trade Walls, FIN. POST,
Aug. 13, 1992, at 4; CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms); see infra notes 54-60. When the Canadian House of Commons and Senate
passed a joint resolution requesting British Parliament to patriate the Canadian Constitution,
they also requested a Charter be entrenched to protect civil liberties. Parliament assented and
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched on April 17, 1982. The Charter purports
to guarantee certain democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, equality rights, language
rights, minority language education rights, and native rights. Devamithran, supra note 2, at
23. The federal proposal would have transferred some powers exercised by the federal
government to Quebec and the other provincial governments, but in most cases it recom-
mended power-sharing arrangements that fell short of Quebec's demands. Winsor, supra note
2.
7 Tierney, supra note 5; support for Quebec independence in the public opinion polls has
been as high as 70 percent, though many Quebecers have been reluctant to risk losing federal
government support after having been hit hard by the recession. Winsor, supra note 2.
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acceding to too many of the French-speaking province's demands.8 On July
7, 1992, however, the federal government and the premiers from the nine
English-speaking provinces forged a new agreement to grant the French-
speaking province its demands for special treatment in a last-ditch effort to
preserve their national union.9 The federal government revised the "distinct
society" clause in late July, and shortly thereafter Bourassa ended his
two-year boycott of the Canada Round.'0 Quebec's Premier then met with
the other premiers for the first full-blown constitutional negotiations in two
years. 1
These negotiations resulted in the Charlottetown Accord of 1992
(Accord). 12 Among the provisions of the Charlottetown package were the
recognition of Quebec's status as a distinct society (along with greater
powers to preserve its francophone character), the replacement of the
appointed Senate with an elected chamber comprised of equal membership
from each province, and the recognition of the aboriginal right to self-gov-
ernment. 3 The Prime Minister and provincial leaders decided to put the
Accord to a national vote on October 26, 1992-the scheduled date for the
referendum in Quebec on sovereignty-reasoning that the national vote
would sidetrack the issue of secession in Quebec. 4 The dominant senti-
ment among Canadian citizens, nevertheless, was that too much had been
surrendered to the demands of others: the answer to the October referendum
was a resounding "no."' 5
' Tierney, supra note 5.
9 Canada's Future Now In Quebec's Hands, STAR TRIB., July 10, 1992, at 16A
[hereinafter Canada's Future]. The Constitutional Affairs Minister, all provinces except
Quebec, both territories (Northwest and Yukon) and the four native groups agreed to the
tentative July 7 deal, but did not sign any binding written agreement. Stewart, supra note 4.
The deal also resolved several long-standing constitutional issues by permitting native
self-government, giving each province equal representation in the national Senate, and
dismantling provincial trade barriers. Canada's Future, supra.
0 Sarah Scott, Premiers' Launch Political Suicide: Parizeau; Distinct-Society Deal Could
Erode Bill 101; Shaping the Future, GAZET=E (Montreal), July 31, 1992, at BI.
"1 Geddes, supra note 6.
12 Janigan, supra note 4.
13 Id.; Harold M. Waller, What Lies Ahead for Canada; In the Wake of Charlottetown,
NEW LEADER, Nov. 2, 1992, at 9..
14 Waller, supra note .13.
's Id. Besides Quebec, Nova Scotia, four Western provinces, and the Yukon Territory
also voted against the Accord. Clyde H. Farnsworth, No Vote, No End to Quebec Dispute,
Hous. CHRON., Oct. 28, 1992.
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Initially, the October outcome left the constitutional negotiations in a
stalemate; the creation of a compromise agreeable to everyone seemed
impossible.1 6  Canadian politicians promised instead to attend to the
nation's lagging economy,"7 with no thoughts of resuming constitutional
bargaining in the foreseeable future. 8 For the first time in recent years,
national unity ceased to be a major issue both in the media and among
academics.' 9
Less than six months after the October referendum, however, the
constitutional issue is being raised once again.' Following the public
announcements of Premier Bourassa's resumed bout with cancer2' and the
resignation of Prime Minister Mulroney announced February 24th," came
the declaration of the Quebec government that it was ready to resume
negotiations with the other provinces.' Rather than viewing the Meech
Lake and Charlottetown accords as failures, the Quebec government sees
them merely as references for the next round of constitutional negotia-
tions.2
As of this writing, the federal government has yet to respond to Quebec's
offer. In the past, however, the Prime Minister has warned that the federal
government will not return to the constitutional issue at least until there is
16 Carol Goar, Things Did Get Solved on Referendum Day, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 14,
1992, at D4.
"7 Farnsworth, supra note 15. The economy currently has 1.5 million Canadians out of
work. Id.
18 Waller, supra note 13.
'9 Goar, supra note 16.
2 David Bercuson, In Canada We Can't Seem to Agree, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 6,
1993, at A4.
21 Peter Benesh, Cancer Threatens Canadian Unity, S. F. CHRON., Feb: 1, 1993, at A7.
"Bourassa revealed in mid-January that the malignant melanoma he thought he had beaten 2
years ago is back." Id.
" A Chronology of the Mulroney Years In Power, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 25, 1993. at B 1.
The Prime Minister will remain in office until June, when his party (the Tory or Progressive
Conservative Party) will hold a leadership convention to succeed him. Joan Bryden,
Campbell Soars Over Chetien; Poll Shows She's Favored 2 to I as Choice for PM, GAZETTE
(Montreal), Mar. 22, 1993, at Al.
' Phillip Authier, Remillard Says Quebec is Ready to Re-Open Constitutional Talks,




a change in players." But the Prime Minister is stepping down and a
federal election will be held this year. Bourassa is preparing to depart
and the separatist Parti Quebecois (PQ)' are readying for a provincial
election in 1994 (followed by a referendum on outright independence by
June 25, 1995). Thus, a change in players is imminent.2s
II. CONSTITUTION VERSUS INDEPENDENT STATE: QUEBEC'S CHOICE
OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN LIGHT OF PROVINCIAL HISTORY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Quebec as a Member of The Canadian Federation
1. Constitution Act of 1867
The Constitution Act of 1867 (Constitution Act)29 established Canada as
the first quasi-independent dominion within the British Empire.30 Ontario
and Quebec were divided into two provinces, although they had been united
as one colony since 1840.31 The Constitution Act united the provinces of
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Quebec into the new nation,
Canada.32 Under the Constitution Act, the Canadian constitutional system
2 Robert McKenzie, Quebec Wants to Discuss Unity, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 10, 1993, at
Al.
" Quebec After Mulroney, supra note 2. "The Backroom wisdom in Quebec City holds
that it is only a matter of time before Bourassa takes his leave to concentrate on his fight
against cancer." Id.
2" The Parti Quebecois (PQ), founded in 1968 and currently led by Jacques Parizeau, leads
the separatist movement in Quebec by campaigning for the separatist cause in provincial
elections. The Bloc Quebecois, led by Lucien Bouchard, campaigns on the federal level.
Despite separate leaderships, the parties support one another and are both working towards
the same goal. Benesh, supra note 21.
23 See id.
29 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867).
" Edgar S. Efrat, Self-Determination: Canadian Perspectives, in SELF-DETERMINATION:
NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONs 22 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A.
Friedlander, eds. 1980) [hereinafter SELF-DETERMINATION].
" CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) pt. II (Union) § 6.
32 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) pt. II (Union) § 5; James G. Matkin,
Chronology, in CoNsTrrUTIONs, supra note 2, at 4.
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was based upon two principles: the Westminster parliamentary system33
and a new confederative mechanism. 4  This system divided powers
between the central government and the various provincial governments.35
The French Canadians were uneasy that the Constitution Act made French
Canada part of a larger nation, but were confident that the guarantees built
into the new constitution, together with the return of the provincial capital
to Quebec City, would help them preserve their language, religion, and
cultural values. 6 Over the years, however, French Canadians "remained
concerned about their future as a French-speaking society within an
increasingly English-speaking North America."3  The people of Quebec
became increasingly "aware of the difficulties of preserving a distinct
French-speaking culture of six million on a continent where more than 200
million people speak English."''
Although previously Quebec had been a largely rural province suspicious
not only of English-speakers, but of modernization in general,39 in 1960,
the Quebec Liberal Party came to power intent on change.' Under the
leadership of Jean Lesage, the Liberals used all the governmental power at
their disposal to improve the educational system, create jobs for the growing
French middle class, and ensure opportunity and economic power for French
Quebecers.4 So far-reaching were the Liberal's reforms, the process they
"3 Under the Westminster system, the Canadian Senate, like the House of Lords, is
removed from the electoral contest. Efrat, supra note 30, at 23; CAN. CONST. (Constitution
Act, 1867) pt. IV (Legislative Power) § 18.
3'CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) pt. VI (Distribution of Legislative Powers). The
new mechanism was an attempt to avoid what was perceived as the main weakness of the
American Constitution: the Tenth Amendment's reserving unspecified powers to the states,
which allegedly contributed to the Civil War. Efrat, supra note 30, at 22.
3 CAN. CONsT. (Constitution Act, 1867) pt. IV (Legislative Power) pt. V (Provincial
Constitutions); CoNsTrrtnONS, supra note 2, at 4.
The Constitutional Debate; A Straight Talking Guide for Canadians, MACLEAN'S, July
6, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter The Constitutional Debate].
37 id.
38 id.
"For Want of Glue; From New France to New Quebec, ECONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at
1 [hereinafter For Want of glue]..
41 Id.; David Bercuson, Constitution Worked Well for Quebec, CALGARY HERALD, Nov.
6, 1992, at A4.
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set in motion has come to be called the "Quiet Revolution." 42 "Not long
after they achieved power, [the Liberals] began to demand a special
constitutional status for Quebec."'43 Lesage's demand for special status was
later taken up by his successor, Daniel Johnson, who thought Quebec should
be equal in stature, if not power, with Ottawa-home to the federal
government." This demand was the ultimate expression of the "two-
nation" theory: the idea that Canada was a dual nation comprised of Quebec
and English-speaking Canada."
In the mid-1960's, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicultural-
ism recommended that if Canadians were to live in harmony, Canada had to
be a "nation of nations," with "unity in diversity" as the national motto.
6
Such sentiments became law in 1969 when Canada became officially
bilingual under the Official Languages Act.' Under the Royal Commis-
sion's recommendation, English and French were formally declared the
official languages of the Parliament of Canada, the federal courts, the federal
government, and the federal administration." Then in 1971, the govern-
ment adopted a multicultural policy and Canada became a "nation of
nations."'t9
Multiculturalism was supposed to foster national unity.' Just nine years
after the multicultural society was announced, however, Quebec found itself
42 For Want of Glue, supra note 39. The main effect of the Quiet Revolution was to turn
the province from a society of French-Canadians driven by fear of cultural obliteration into
one of "Quebecois" driven by economic assertiveness, and by becoming "masters in their own
house." This widely recognized craving for self-determination expressed itself in the
trappings and symbols of nationhood: the provincial legislature became the Assemblee
nationale, Quebec missions abroad started flying the Fleur-de-lis instead of the Maple Leaf,
and Quebec began participating as a "sovereign" member in international conferences of the
Francophonie. Efrat, supra note 30, at 27-28.
13 Bercuson, supra note 41.44 L
4 Id.
46 Robert Sibley, The Dangers Of Our Diversity. OrrAWA CrrZEN, June 30, 1992, at A9.
4 Official Languages Act, R.S.C. Ch. 0-2 at 1 (1985); In 1974, the Official Language Act
of Quebec was given Royal Assent and French was thus declared the official language of
Quebec. This Act was repealed in 1977, but was subsequently replaced with a new bill (Bill
101) that basically achieved the same result. Que. Rev. Stat. ch. c-1l (1977); Efrat, supra
note 30, at 26; Ellen Walsh, Chronology, in CoNSiTruTIoNs, supra note 2, at 9.
8 Efrat, supra note 30, at 26.
4 Sibley, supra note 46.
s Id.
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heading towards a referendum in 1980 that could lead to the breakup of
Canada." In an effort to steer the province away from secession, then
Prime-Minister Pierre Trudeau promised Quebec "renewed federalism" if the
referendum of the separatist PQ was rejected.52 Quebecers voted to remain
with Canada.
5 3
2. The Constitution Act of 1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Two years later, the Constitution Act of 1982' effected the patriation of
the Constitution Act of 1867 and the subsequent enshrinement of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." The Charter, however, in no
sense interfered with the separation of powers between the government of
Canada and the governments of the provinces set forth in the Constitution
Act of 1867.56 Rather, the Charter was directed equally to both levels of
government and guaranteed certain rights and freedoms for the benefit of the
citizenry." Further, the Charter provided a mechanism for protecting the
citizenry from incursions by the two separate levels of government into these.
protected rights and freedoms.5 ' Each level of government could, however,
5' Carol Goar, P.M. Echoes Trudeau But Times Have Changed, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 16,
1991, at D2. In May of 1980, a referendum was held in Quebec on the question of whether
or not Quebecers should give their provincial government permission to negotiate
"sovereignty-association." Though the government in Quebec was Separatist, Quebecers
voted for Canada. David Bercuson, Canada Must Put Its Agony Behind CALGARY HERALD,
July 24, 1992, at A4; Minister Responsible for Constitutional Affairs at the Annual General
Meeting of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association at the Harbour Castle Westin
Convention Centre, CAN. NEwsWiRE LTD., June 12, 1992, at I (hereinafter Minister
Responsible].
52 "Renewed federalism" was broadly understood as being synonymous with new powers
for Quebec in the federation. Bauch, supra note 2.
53 Minister Responsible, supra note 51.
4 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982).
15 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms);
Bauch, supra note 2. Patriation of the 1867 Act meant amending it no longer required an act
of the British Parliament. See The Constitutional Debate, supra note 41.
ms CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982); McKinney v. Bd. of Gov's of the Univ. of
Guelph and Att'y Gen. of Ontario, 1987 Ont. C.A. LEXIs 82 at * 14; see also Michael Ritter,
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in CONsTrrUTIONS, supra note 2, at 23-36.
" CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
§§ 1-23; McKinney at *14-15.
" CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
§ 24; McKinney at *15.
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still legislate and act with respect to all subject to its jurisdiction, provided
that its actions were not inconsistent with the Charter.5 9 In adopting the
Charter, Canada took its first step towards creating a political culture
oriented toward individual rights rather than the Canadian tradition of
collective rights.'
Quebecers, however, felt betrayed in that the Constitution Act of 1982
failed to include any gain of the sort promised for Quebec by Trudeau.6'
Moreover, the subsequent introduction of the Charter was perceived by the
political elite as an infringement of the Quebec National Assembly's powers
to enact laws to ensure the survival of the French language in the prov-
ince;"' eventually, the rest of the province understood why. After the
Assembly passed Bill 101,63 a law designed to promote the use of French
in Quebec through unilingual signs, several lower courts ruled that the signs
provision violated both the Quebec and Canadian Charters of Rights."
While the rulings pleased Quebec's anglophone minority, it outraged the
francophone majority.' Thus, many Quebecers saw the new Constitution
59 CAN. CONsT. pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) § 33 (Constitution Act,
1902); McKinney.
'0 Sibley, supra note 46. Collective rights, in contrast to individual human rights span
a spectrum from simple freedom of association to a variety of special remedies and
protections. Groups may assert the right to their own schools or to make their language the
official language of a given area; they may seek special political rights or to block the
entrance of other nationalities into their homeland. 'The ultimate collective right, of course,
is the right to create an independent state." Robert Cullen, Human Rights Quandry; The
Costs of Vagueness, 71 FOREIGN AFF., 79 (1992).
6' Bauch, supra note 2.
6 Id.; see note 57 and accompanying text.
63 R.S.Q. ch. c-11 (1977).
6 CAN. CoNsT. (Constitution Act. 1982) pt. 1 (Charter of Rights and Freedoms); Alliance
Quebec Offered To Help Anyone Wanting To Fight Sign Law, GAZETTE (Montreal), May 31,
1992, at 1 [hereinafter Alliance Quebec]; When Countries Splinter, ECONOMIST, June 13,
1992, at 11; see also Devamithran, supra note 2, at 15. The Supreme Court agreed, and the
controversial section was struck down in 1988. Quebec Sign Ruling Sparks Furor, FACTS ON
FI E WORLD NEws DI., Dec. 23, 1988, at 957 D3. [hereinafter Quebec Sign Ruling].
65 Id. Quebec (Bourassa) then invoked the "notwithstanding clause" of the Charter, which
allows a province to override most rights in the Charter provided they do so expressly after
a vote in the legislature. The legislature subsequently passed Bill 178 - a law that banned
most outdoor non-French signs. Premier Bourassa's action was the first time the clause was
utilized to overturn a court ruling. Id. "Resorting to the loophole by Bourassa's liberal
government was a clear instance of pandering to Quebec nationalists - - and enraged English
speakers within and outside the province." Benesh, supra note 21.
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and Charter as having very little to offer. In their minds, secession remained
the only option.
In 1985, however, a new government came to power in the province, one
whose leader rejected separation and saw Quebec's future in issues
Quebecers wanted to see addressed.66 In addition, Brian Mulroney's
election as Canada's 18th prime minister brought civility to the Ottawa6 -
Quebec relationship after a decade of confrontation." Prime Minister
Mulroney met with the other premiers in 1986, and all agreed that their top
constitutional priority was to bring about Quebec's full and active participa-
tion in the Canadian federation.' This, in turn, led to the 1987 gathering
at Meech Lake.70
B. Secessionist Self-Determination
1. Questions and Issues Accompanying Secession
With the Parti Quebecois set to vote on independence in 1995, secession
has once again become a topic of both concern and debate for Quebec,
Canada, and other countries. The presence of a strong separatist movement
is a matter of acute concern to the unified State which will likely be
dismembered by the secession of the disaffected province.7' Moreover,
' Minister Responsible, supra note 51. In particular. Quebec wanted to see addressed the
issues of preserving its language and culture and recognizing the province as a distinct
society. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing Quebec's demand for distinct
society status).
67 The Canadian federal government is located in the province of Ottawa, and the two
terms are often used interchangeably.
" Janigan, supra note 4; It's Our Future, supra note 2. Prime Minister Mulroney built
a broad and unusual coalition that brought together the Tory (Progressive Conservative)
party's traditional constituency in the Canadian West with a massive bloc of voters in his
home province of Quebec. "Mulroney's Tory Party accommodated hard-line, right-wing
Westerners who wanted little government and less taxation, medieval social policies, and no
state support for bilingualism and multiculturalism. The party also comfortably housed Red
Tories who were pragmatic about economic matters but opposed the death penalty, favored
easy and publicly financed access to abortion, and promoted bilingualism." John-Cruick-
shank, Star Search, Tory-Style, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 10, 1993, at 19.
69 Minister Responsible, supra note 51. The agreement was formally issued as the
Edmonton Declaration of 1986. Id.
'o See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing the Meech Lake Accord).
7 LEE C. BuccHErr, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION ix (1978).
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legal arguments for a "right" to secede may raise fundamental issues
regarding the internal constitutional framework of the country. In addition,
such a movement may also be a matter of practical and legal concern for the
international community as a whole." The "tendency of modern secession-
ist movements to seek to establish the legal legitimacy of their claims by
invoking the international doctrine of self-determination raises thorny legal
problems relating to the applicability of this doctrine to minority groups
within unified States.""
2. Legql Development of the Self-determination Concept
The "self-determination" concept in international legal theory and
jurisprudence advocates the idea that a homogenous people has the "right"
to determine its own destiny as a distinct sovereign nation, or the "right" to
maintain its own national traditions within a larger political entity.74 Three
interconnecting subtopics are involved: external self-determination (deter-
mination of international status); internal self-determination (selection of a
form of government); and the methods by which these two decisions are
made."
Historically, the original doctrine of self-determination put forth by
President Woodrow Wilson was deficient in its definition of the "self."76
Because any "self' was distinct from other "selves" inhabiting the globe,
determining a group's distinctness seemed a logical starting point." A
group's distinctness could be evidenced by characteristics that distinguished
the group from the ambient population." These characteristics could
7 Id. "The unbridled assertion of collective rights, most often expressed as an aspiration
to national self-determination, has become a major threat to global stability." Cullen, supra
note 60. See infra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Yugoslavia as an example of
the disastrous potential of the assertion of collective rights).
73 BUCCHErr, supra note 71, at x;
74 Jordan J. Paust, Self-Determination: A Definitional Focus, in SELF-DETERMINATION,
supra note 30, at 11.
75 See MICHLA POMERANcE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRA TcE 37,29 (1982).
76 Id. at 18. The Wilsonian doctrine, "let the people decide," failed to recognize that
somebody had to decide who "the people" were-i.e., "who is the 'self' to whom the right
of self-determination attaches?" Id. at 2; BuccHErr, supra note 71, at 9.
" BUCHHEIT, supra note 71, at 9.
7S Id. at 10.
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include elements of religion, language, race, and geography.7 9
Today, the United Nations Charter cites development of "friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples" as one of its four main purposes. Initially, the
Charter failed to include any general right of self-determination that required
a viable international legal system in which it could be exercised.' An
"edifice" of practice nonetheless evolved in the General Assembly in which,
increasingly, full external self-determination-preferably resulting in
independence-was viewed as an imperative and immediate goal for all
peoples "under colonial or alien domination.""1
Two United Nations Resolutions also contributed to the development of
the self-determination principle. 2 In 1960, the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 1541,3 which stated that a full measure of self-government
could be reached either by emergence as a sovereign independent state, free
association with an independent state, or integration with an independent
state."' The Resolution did not propose any conditions for limiting the
grant and receipt of independence, but strictly regulated the latter two
alternatives.8 5
The more famous Resolution 1514,86 the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, represented an attempt to
revise the U.N. Charter by providing that "all peoples have the right to
self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." '
The context in which the right to self-determination was declared, however,
demonstrated an intention to confine it to the following peoples: those still
"dependent" (in that they inhabit trust territories, non-self-governing
791d.
80 U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-73. See Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Friedlander,
Introduction in SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 30 at xiv; see Paust, supra note 74 at 3-4.
81 POMERANCE, supra note 75, at 10.
' Although General Assembly Resolutions are non-binding, they may become customary
law. Id. at 64.
83 G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 153, U.N. Doe A/4651
(1960).
8 POMERANCE supra note 75, at 10.
8 id. at 64.
86 G.A. Res. 1514 U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., supp No. 16, at 188, U.N. Doc A/L.323
(1960).
' Id.; POMERANCE, supra note 75, at 11.
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territories, or other territories which have not yet attained independence) and
those subjected to "alien subjugation, domination and exploitation."s Thus,
the U.N. overcame the earlier "Wilsonian" era's definitional problem by
opting for territorial, rather than ethnic, criterion. 9
Resolution 1514 is the foundation of what is sometimes known as the
"New U.N. Law of Self-Determination" (New U.N. Law)9°. The New U.N.
Law "consists of a series of explicit and implicit assumptions regarding the
status, scope, and application of the 'right' of self-determination and the
competence of U.N. organs ... to implement the 'right.' ',9 These
assumptions have been deduced from the attitudes adopted in connection
with certain general pronouncements of the U.N., as well as from the
positions assumed by the U.N. in specific cases where the issue of self-deter-
mination was raised.' Although a majority of U.N. members acknowledge
the existence of a New U.N. Law, the exact content of the law is frequently
a topic of debate.93
The U.S. position on the theory is equally as vague. In the Helsinki
Accord of 1975,9 the United States endorsed the consensus that "participat-
ing states will respect the equal rights of people and their right to self-deter-
POMERANCE, supra note 75, at 14.
9 Id. at 18. Proponents of the New U.N. Law seek to separate out the legitimate,
non-colonial States and movements from those of a "colonial-racist-neocolonial" nature. On
the basis of this distinction, proponents "have presumed to allocate definitively rights and
obligations relating to self-determination and other Charter principles." Id. at 74.
90 1d at 12.
9' Id. at 13. For example, such pronouncements as the 1970 Declaration on Friendly
Relations and the 1974 Consensus Definition of Aggression presented some of the U.N.'s
attitudes on the self-determination issue. Id. To illustrate how the U.N.'s position has been
determined from specific cases, the savagery of the Pakistani army in 1971 was influential
in shifting the U.N.'s opinion to the side of Bangladesh. To the extent the Kurds in Iraq, and
the Biafrans in Nigeria suffered similar mistreatment, they each received support for their
cause for a legitimate secession. BUCCHErr, supra note 71 at 213.
92 POMERANCE, supra note 75 at 12. International legal scholars continue the debate as
to who gets the right to self-determination under the New Law and also as to what the
acceptable methods of self-determination actually are. See id. at 24, 28.93 id.
" Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted
in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). The Helsinki Accords are "declarationlsi of principles by the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (q.v.), guiding the relationship between
state parties, inter alia, affirming sovereign equality, declaring the current borders in Europe
inviolable and guaranteeing human rights." JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATiVE LAW 193 (1992).
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mination.' 5  Although the act left deliberately vague what the right to
self-determination meant, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe" has since gradually begun to define it.9' In 1990, the Confeder-
ate declared that it is strictly up to individuals, not governments, to decide
whether they are members of a minority.9' Although the definition process
has stopped well short of declaring that any minority has the right to political
autonomy or statehood, the tendency has certainly been towards expanding
the area of collective rights.99 With little debate, the United States has thus
far followed the trend."°
Thus, Quebecers faced (and still face) one basic choice: remain with the
Federation or leave and declare independence. Dissatisfied with the
Canadian Constitution, and uncertain of the implications of secession,
Quebec joined the other provinces in attempting to rectify the situation
through constitutional reform-first at Meech Lake, then at Charlottetown.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Negotiations in Charlottetown
The Canadian Round negotiations attempted to respond to the collapse of
the Meech Lake Accord and the subsequent rising tide of Quebec separat-
ism.' Prime Minister Mulroney sought to make. specific changes in the
Canadian constitution that would accommodate not only Quebec, but also the
other parts of Canada.' 2 In particular, he attempted to balance "Quebec's
demands against those of other unhappy groups--Canada's natives wanting
self-government, and the outlying provinces desiring better representation
9 Cullen, supra note 60, at 83-84.
9 The Conference was established in July, 1973 as a continuing series of meetings and
has governments of 51 countries as its members. YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS 317 (Union of International Associations ed; 1992).





1 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (discussing Meech Lake and its aftermath).
'o See Minister Responsible, supra note 51; see also Tierney, supra note 5.
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S. ." in the form of an elected and stronger upper house of Parliament.10 3
This, of course, was no easy task.
New hope for success emerged, however, when Quebec Premier Robert
Bourassa decided to return to the full bargaining table last summer as a
result of informal negotiation sessions and a reworded "distinct society"
clause.1" The language of the proposed clause required the Canadian
Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be interpreted in a
manner consistent with certain fundamental characteristics, one being that
"Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society which includes a
French-speaking majority, a unique culture and a civil law tradition." "5
Thus, the new clause made the Constitution more appealing to Quebec.
True, the Canadian Constitution has long recognized Quebec's distinctive
language and culture, and the province's use of the Napoleanic Code in its
civil law."° But Bourassa wanted formal recognition of Quebec's distinct
society to have enough legal weight to override the guarantees accorded the
English minority in Quebec in the Charter."°7
In addition, the new clause reduced the significance of an earlier July,
1992 proposal that would have committed all provincial governments to the
"vitality and development" of official language minorities-English in
Quebec and French outside Quebec. °" Though the new clause at first
appeared to obligate provincial governments in much the same way as the
103 Tierney, supra note 5. The so-called "Triple-E Senate"-Elected, equal, and
effective-would be roughly modeled on the U.S. Senate. This body would be popularly
elected, would be composed of an equal number of representatives from all provinces and the
territories, and would have the power to initiate and approve legislation originating in the
Commons. The Constitutional Debate, supra note 36.
'04 See Scott, supra note 10; Winsor, supra note 2 (discussing Bourassa's boycott of
negotiations).
'0' William Johnson, Price of Bringing Quebec to Table May Be Too High, TORONTO
STAR, July 30, 1992, at All. The words "within Canada" were restored after the omission
of these words in a previous proposal caused a national outcry. Id.; see Geddes, supra note
6 and accompanying text (discussing the Canadian Charter).
106 Winsor, supra note 2; see also James Matkin. Chronology, in CoNsTrrUIONS, supra
note 2.
107 Winsor, supra note 2.
'(* Johnson, supra note 105; Terrance Wills, Distinct Division; Little Support for New
Canada Clause, GAZE'rE (Montreal), Aug. 1, 1992, at A9.
19931
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
July proposal,"° the appearance was merely an illusion. 0  Under the
new clause, governments would have been bound to protect only existing
linguistic rights, which, as Quebec has already shown by its language laws,
are easily flouted."1 '
Premier Bourassa, however, did not have the support of most other
premiers for the new clause being pushed by the federal government."
2
Critics objected to the clause because it strengthened Quebec's hand in
promoting its distinct francophone society and weakened the protection for
the official-language minorities." 3 In 1990, similar opposition in the other
provinces contributed to the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord." 4
In addition, Bourassa brought other issues back with him to the bargaining
table. For example, on the issue of Senate Reform, the Premier initially
opposed having a Senate with equal representation from each province, as
that would effectively "slash Quebec's representation from twenty-three
percent to about nine percent..... A later proposal, however, would have
restored much of Quebec's and Ontario's weight in the upper house." 6
The four provinces with more than two million people--Ontario, Quebec,
British Columbia and Alberta-would have each secured twenty-four seats,
and all other provinces would have obtained eight."7
Also, the Premier sought changes to the provisions of the July deal
regarding native self-government."' The province was concerned that
109 The new clause still provided for the provincial governments' commitment to the
vitality and development of official-language minority communities and to protecting their
linguistic rights as well. Scott, supra note 10.
"0 Johnson, supra note 105.
.. Id. Although Alliance Quebec thought the new clause weakened protection for the
English-speaking in Quebec, Parti Quebecois leader Jacques Parizeau took the opposite view
that the clause could still be challenged, just as it was in the Supreme Court in 1988. Scott,
supra note 10; see Quebec Sign Ruling, supra note 64.
112 Wills, supra note 108.
113 Id.
114 Id.
"15 Edison Stewart, PM, Premiers Inch Closer On Unity Progress Raises Hopes That Full
Talks Can Resume, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 11, 1992, at A8.
116 Stewart, supra note 4.
117 id
10 Stewart, supra note 115.
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large chunks of its territory could be lost to native control." 9  Native
leaders, on the other hand, accused the federal government of betraying their
trust by offering a constitutional deal behind their backs to get Quebec to
return to the negotiating table."2
.Also under the July 7 tentative agreement, the Yukon and Northwest
territories could have become provinces by the consent of the federal
Parliament alone."' In the end, Bourassa accepted a later proposal, where
the federal government would require the consent of all the regions before
allowing the territories to assume provincial status.' 22  Premier Bourassa
decided to accept this indirect, "political" veto over the creation of new
provinces, rather than hold out for a more secure veto embedded in the
Constitution, as was offered under the Meech Lake Accord.1
23
Did Bourassa make too many concessions, or did he ask for too much?
Evidently, each view had its own group of supporters. Together, they
rejected the package.
B. The Charlottetown Accord: Why Canadians Said "No"
In spite of the collective efforts of the provincial leaders, and in spite of
all the re-negotiating and compromising, the October 26, 1992 referendum
resulted in a decisive rejection of the Charlottetown Accord. 24 Although
19 Id. Although self-governing at the time of their first contact with European society,
Canada's aboriginal citizens - the Indians and Eskimos - have been governed under the Indian
Act since 1876. The natives' increasing demands for self-determination finally lead to a new
recognition and urgency to secure the legitimate place of Canada's aboriginal peoples within
the Canadian Federation. Efrat, supra note 30, at 38.
120 Wills, supra note 108. "Section 35.1 of the Constitution Act of 1982 commits
governments to the principal that aboriginal peoples will participate in discussions relating to
amendments of the Constitution which relate directly to them." CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
2, Canada Supplement at 6.
121 Johnson, supra note 105. The two territorial governments objected to the 1982
constitutional provision which requires the consent of Parliament and seven provinces,
including at least 50 percent of the population of Canada, before they can assume the
provincial status they desire. Id.
'22 Id. Wills, supra note 108.
123 Johnson, supra note 105. Under the Meech Lake agreement, each province was given
a veto over the creation of future provinces. Id.
124 For a detailed discussion of the negotiation process, see supra notes 8-16 and
accompanying text. See Also The Referendum Vote By the People of the No was Not the
Failure of Politics Itself, GAzErE (Montreal), Nov. 1, 1992, at B3 [hereinafter The
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the "No" voters saw victory together, they apparently were united only in
their rejection of the agreement."n
In late August of 1992, Bourassa suffered a tremendous setback in his
efforts to sell the Charlottetown Accord.7 6 Media organizations outside
Quebec published the transcript of a recorded conversation between Andre
Tremblay, one of Bourassa's advisers during negotiations, and Diane
Wilhelmy, Quebec's Deputy Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs.1 7
During the conversation, Tremblay and Wilhelmy discussed how, according
to Tremblay, Bourassa had "caved in" during the negotiations." With his
credibility seriously damaged, Bourassa spent the majority of the referendum
campaign'" fighting off accusations resulting from the "Wilhelmy Af-
fair.,1
30
At this time, however, "No" voters clearly remained outside the political
mainstream.' 3' Thus, when the Reform Party of Canada 32 declared its
Referendum]. "[Overall, 54 per cent of Canadians vetoed Charlottetown. Opposition was
especially strong in Alberta (60 per cent), Manitoba (62 per cent), and British Columbia (68
per cent). Interestingly, the total vote against the Accord in Quebec was only about 56 per
cent-and that figure includes many who disliked the deal but oppose secession as well, such
as the federalists aligned with Trudeau." Waller, supra note 13.
's The Referendum, supra note 124.
'~ See Barry Came et al., Defining Moments; Four Performances That Shaped the
Referendum of 1992, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 2, 1992, at 17.
27 Id. An injunction prevented a local radio station from airing the recorded conversa-
tion. Id.
128 Id.
"9 The referendum campaign, five weeks of politicking, officially began on Sept. 18,
1992. Came, supra note 126.
'30 Id.; Analyzing the Results in Quebec, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 2, 1992, at 17 [hereinafter
Analyzing]. Also damaging were the comments of British Columbia Constitutional Affairs
Minister Moe Sihota. Sihota recounted in great detail "how the premiers had ganged up on
Quebec and stopped Robert Bourassa in his tracks." Id. Lastly, in an effort to shift the focus
in Quebec away from Bourassa's skills as a negotiator and onto the economic terrain, the
Prime Minister himself made somewhat of a blunder. During a speech in Quebec, the PM
picked up a sheet of paper and ripped it in two, saying that a "No" vote would destroy
everything that was gained in the negotiations at Charlottetown. The media linked the act to
another part of the speech in which the PM warned that a "No" vote "would start the
dismantling process in Canada." Thus, "the incident reinforced an image that federal officials
had done their best to dispel; that of Mulroney as a bullying, threatening prime minister."
Came, supra note 126.
131 id.
132 The Reform Party of Canada is a Western-based political party led by Preston
Manning. Waller, supra note 13.
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opposition to the Accord in early September, the party was opting for a
somewhat risky strategy. 33 But the subsequent surge in support for the
"No" side throughout the country allowed Reformers to claim that they,
unlike their rivals,134 "were listening to and reflecting the 'grassroots'
sentiment to the [C]onstitution." 135  Thus, the party declared, it had
achieved its goal: any future attempt at constitutional reform would include
input from the Reform Party of Canada."3 Ironically, support for the party
in the polls actually dropped even as the "No" campaign they headed gained
ground. 37
Reform leader. Preston Manning and other Western opponents of the
Accord pointed to the Accord's failure to achieve satisfactory Senate reform,
"its excessive concessions to Quebec, and the ramifications of aboriginal
self-government."'1 Similarly, numerous small private groups who were
dissatisfied with one feature or another boosted the "No" cause as the
campaign wore on. 39 Increasingly, "it seemed that attentions were being
fixed on the Accord's specific shortcomings rather than on the totality of the
package and the context of the negotiations that produced it."'"
Quebec federalists' 4' also objected to the Accord, believing that it
"strengthened local power at the expense of the Federal government and the
rights of individuals." 42  Moreover, former Prime Minister Trudeau
became a major influence in swaying the vote against the Accord by
"dismissing Quebec's gains as 'blackmail,' and publicly condemning the
'3 Came, supra note 126.
134 Rivals of the Reform Party include the Progressive Conservative Party (headed by
Mulroney), the Liberal Party (headed by Bourassa) and the New Democratic Party. Waller,
supra note 13.
13S Came, supra note 126.
136 Id.
131 The Referendum, supra note 124.
3 Waller, supra note 13.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. Under Quebec law, which required that there be only two umbrella committees
-one for the "Yes" side and one for the "No" side -"No" voters in Quebec were compelled
to work under the same banner. This, oddly enough, put separatists and federalists on the
same committee. The law was drafted by the PQ government for the 1980 vote on
sovereignty-association. Reform Now, Before the Next Vote, GAzErrE (Montreal), Nov. 9,
1992, at B2 [hereinafter Reform Now).
142 Waller, supra note 13. Approximately 20-25% of Quebecers are federalists. Patricia
Bush, Quebec Separatism Issue Rises Anew, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, Oct. 28, 1992 at A26.
1993]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
whole constitutional process,"1 43 thus making opposition to Quebec's
demands "politically correct," and buttressing the federalist's position."4
Although Canada's more mainstream politicians were united behind the
Accord, their "public esteem" had suffered so greatly in the past that in the
end, they hurt the "Yes" side more than they helped it." 5  Although
Trudeau has been retired from politics for the last eight years, the former
Prime Minister remains highly credible, and capable of trenchant criticism;
Trudeau's remarks were perhaps the single most important influence in
swaying the vote from "Yes" to "No"."
6
Officially, however, the "No" committee was headed by PQ leader Jacques
Parizeau, who viewed a "No" vote as a step towards the road to indepen-
dence." In the end, many French-speaking Quebecois voted "No". The
PQ argues the rejection was because voters thought the Accord failed to give
their province the additional power required to preserve Quebec's language
and culture, and because they felt like Bourassa had not done enough during
the negotiations to ensure adequate protection for Quebec's concerns. "'
Despite the PQ's claims, however, most Quebecers simply felt that the
Accord was a poor deal overall; they were not, in actuality, supporting the
view that Bourassa had mishandled the negotiations. 49
143 Analyzing, supra note 130. Ironically, it was Trudeau's patriation of the Constitution
Act, without Quebec's support, that made the constitutional process necessary in the first
place. Id.
'44 Id.; see Came, supra note 126.
145 The Referendum, supra note 124. In contrast, the provinces who firmly voted "yes"
-Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island-"have the most trusted leaders in
the country." Id.
146 Id.; Analyzing, supra note 125; Waller, supra note 13.
147 Reform Now, supra note 141. At least 90% of Quebec non-francophones voted yes
because they thought a "No" vote might lead to separation. "This perception was reinforced
by the fact that the PQ controlled the official 'No' campaign committee." Don MacPherson,
Cold Comfort; Referendum Result Shows Equality Party Doomed, GAZETrE (Montreal), Nov.
10, 1992 at B3.
148 Waller supra note 13; Benesh, supra note 21.
"9 Analyzing, supra note 130. Forty-four percent of the "No" voters reported doing so
because their province failed to get enough concessions from the rest of Canada. However,




C. Post-Charlottetown: The Constitutional Issue in the Face of New
Leadership
Throughout his eight years in office, Prime Minister Mulroney earnestly
sought to fulfill former Prime Minister Trudeau's 1980 promise to Quebecers
of renewed federalism.'3 But in June of this year, Mulroney will hand
over the reigns without having achieved his goal. Renewed federalism has
been rejected by English-speaking Canada."' Quebec remains bound by
a Constitution it has never endorsed and does not accept.152 Moreover, the
Constitutional debate and the two failed accords have aggravated regional
tensions and provoked clashes among ethnic and language groups."5 3
Federalism has never contemplated such discord.
Thus, critics argue that the constitutional issue should have been left alone.
They argue that the symbolism was too destructive and created more disunity
than unity." Many assert Prime Minister Mulroney was more interested
in arriving at a constitutional consensus than in providing good govern-
ment; 55 and he and his fellow Canadian politicians simply propagated a
lot of hype and hysteria over a crisis that never really existed." Perhaps
they were the only ones who believed they were saving the country with
their constitutional haggling.'57
But in truth, the Quebec question has been at the top of the constitutional
agenda since 1960, more than twenty years before Brian Mulroney became
Prime Minister.'58 Even then Pro-separatists were demonstrating on St.
Jean Baptiste Day.59 Since then, the question-what was the place of the
1so Edison Stewart, Unity Issue Unresolved Despite PM's Best Efforts, TORONTO STAR,
Feb. 26, 1993, at B7; see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing Trudeau and
renewed federalism).
,s' Bercuson, supra note 41.
152 Goar, supra note 16.
153 Janigan, supra note 4.
4 Stewart, supra note 150.
s Bercuson, supra note 20.
15 See Goar, supra note 16.
137 Id.
15 Bercuson, supra note 41; see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing the
Liberal Party coming to power in 1960 and starting the Quiet Revolution).
'" Sibley, supra note 46. St. Jean Baptiste Day is one of Quebec's two "national"
holidays, and is celebrated every June 24 in the province. St. Jean Message Losing Audience,
GAZErTE, (Montreal), June 23, 1992, at B2. "Despite worthy attempts to present the holiday
as an event for all Quebecers, the parade and its ambience tend to become vigorous
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Quebec nation to be within the larger Canadian nation?-has been asked
increasingly, and increasingly vehemently.' 60
Although when Mulroney came to power, the issue was dormant in
Quebec for the first time in years, 161 Canadian history has repeatedly
shown that while national unity issues may lie dormant for awhile, they
never completely disappear."6  Political scientists estimate that forty
percent of Quebecers are in fact hard-core independantistes, and as PQ leader
Jacques Parizeau noted, "[a]t that level of support, nothing vanishes."' 63
Thus, in taking on the constitutional challenge, the Prime Minister was
simply facing reality, choosing not to ignore the underlying issue rather than
pretend the crisis was gone for good. Had he instead avoided the question,
he would have been called a coward. Instead, because he poured his heart
and soul into the search for an end to the problem, he should at the very
least be commended for his zeal and his perseverance.'" Attempting to
solve the problem through constitutional reform had about as good a chance
of success as it did of failure. Mulroney cannot be faulted for the Accords'
rejection or for the debate which ended in deadlock.
Regardless of whether or not the Prime Minister is to blame for the
current situation, he will be leaving the federal scene in June, and the race
for new leadership will begin.'5 If, after all his efforts, Mulroney was
unable to solve the constitutional problem, what can his successor possibly
do? Perhaps the regime simply is, by its very nature, impossible to
reform."6 Defense Minister Kim Campbell (Conservative), who pollsters
say is well on her way to becoming Canada's first woman Prime Minis-
ter, 67 claims that as a woman and westerner she understands the political
statements of political nationalism - a propaganda exercise for the Society's goals of Quebec
independence and cultural protectionism." Id. For example, in 1991 the parade featured
huge, block-sculpted models representing Quebec as a "land of giants", capable of taking
charge of its future but held back by familiar oppressors. Id.
160 Bercuson, supra note 20.
161 Quebec After Mulroney, supra note 2.
'62 Constitutional Debate, supra note 36.
'63 Carol Goar, End of Unity Crisis No Guarantee of Domestic Bliss, TORONTO STAR,
April 14, 1992, at A19.
'" See Stewart, supra note 150.
165 See Philip Authier, It's a Blow to Federalism and to Quebec, Ryan Says, GAZETTE
(Montreal), Feb. 25, 1993, at Al.
'" Id. (quoting PQ constitutional critic Jacques Brassard).
167 Bryden, supra note 22. A poll of 1,500 voters conducted March 15-18 found that 42%
of Canadians thought Campbell would make the best PM. Id.
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alienation felt by French-speaking Quebecers.' Unfortunately, so far, that
is all she has said on the subject."6
D. Sovereignty
As the political situation in Canada changes, one thing remains clear: the
Quebec question will soon surface again, whether the new Prime Minister
wants it to or not. Parizeau and the PQ have already developed a plan to
achieve secession by 1995, based on Bourassa's likely resignation and the
lack of any potential worthy successor.70 The PQ hopes for a separatist
sweep of Quebec in the 1994 provincial election, which would be followed
by a referendum on outright independence in 1995, on St. Jean Baptiste Day
(June 24)."' When last faced with such a referendum, Quebecers voted
"No."'" With two-thirds of Quebec's Francophones having rejected the
October 26 referendum, however, separatist's hopes are high.
73
But sovereignty would have its costs-for Quebec and Canada. 174 In the
event of separation, the two "new" governments would likely face consider-
able difficulties in financing their debts and deficits. Canada's inability
to finance its excessive debt domestically has already made Canadians
extremely dependent on foreign investment. 76  As for Quebec, the new
independent state would not necessarily be entitled to continued benefits
from the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement if it were no longer
" Jon Ferry, Campbell Officially Enters Leadership Race to Succeed Mulroney, Reuters,
March 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
169 Id. "Fully 47 percent of Canadians were unable to cite anything they like about
Campbell and 75 per cent couldn't cite anything they dislike." Bryden, supra, note 22.
170 Benesh, supra, note 21.
' Id.; see supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing St: Jean Baptiste Day).
Separation will be the issue in the Quebec election, unless the pro-sovereignty hardliners who
control the PQ agree to soften the party policy before then, which seems unlikely (since the
party is currently leading in popularity among francophones).. "That policy, as stated in the
party program and by party leader Jacques Parizeau, says a vote for the PQ would be a vote
to begin the process leading to sovereignty to be held within eight months of the election of
the PQ government." MacPherson, supra note 147.
" See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing Trudeau and renewed
federalism).
173 Benesh, supra note 21.
174 McKenzie, supra note 5.
1 The Constitutional Debate, supra note 36.
176 Id.
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a part of Canada.'" Even if the United States were receptive to a separate
deal with a separate Quebec, their bargaining power would be substantially
less as an independent state than as a dominant player within the Canadian
federation.!78 In addition, the new government would have to settle many
other issues, both political and legal: assets would need to be divided,
citizenship rules developed, and the relationship between Canada and Quebec
more clearly defined.'
If the federation broke apart, however, it would not likely be consumed
by Yugoslavia-style civil wars; ° unlike the Yugoslavs, Quebecers are not
imprisoned in a colonial situation, subject to dominion by outsiders.''
Rather, they have full representation in Parliament and the civil service."s
Still, the prospect of a Canada divided against itself is an unpleasant
one-especially for the United States.18 3 In particular, a break-up of the
Federation would complicate the United States' security and commercial ties
with its "nearest ally and most important trade partner.""' As President
Bush said on a visit to Toronto in 1990, "a unified Canada is a great
partner."' s
International legal principles present another sovereignty issue. The debate
on the legal status of the principle of self-determination continues, but the
belief that it exists as a legal right is held more widely today than ever
before.' s6 The determination of "which 'self' is entitled to determine what,
17 Sheldon Gordon, How the U.S. Can Push Canadian Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1990,
at 23.
178 Id.
'7 Walter Stefaniuk, The Break-Up of Canada, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 16, 1993, at A7.
For example, Canada and Quebec would have to decide whether to have free trade or customs
duties. They would also have to make a decision about whether to retain a common currency,
and, if so, whether to have a central bank that controls the currency. Id.
'80 Canada's Future, supra note 9; Chuck Sudetic, Yugoslav Fighting Breaks Cease-Fire,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1991, at AlO. The Yugoslavs were divided by nationality, religion, and
history. Civil wars broke out after Croatia declared its independence on June 25, 1991. As
one writer notes, "Yugoslavia most dramatically demonstrates the disastrous potential of the
assertion of collective rights in the postcommunist era." Id.
'81 Stefaniuk, supra note 179.
182 id.
183 Canada's Future, supra note 9.
18 Gordon, supra note 177.
'8 Id. President Bush made this statement while on a visit to Toronto in April of 1990.
Id.
186POMERANcE, supra note 75, at 73.
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when, and how, remains the central question [facing the international
community] which eludes simple objective answers."' 87 As some Canadian
constitutional lawyers argue, self-determination is a legal right which applies
only to a colonial or subjugated people.'" Other legal scholars maintain
that the right to self-determination is not so limited, and that if Quebecers
decide they want to be independent, no legal rule exists which would prevent
them from leaving.'8 9
Lastly, the status of secession within the self-determination doctrine
remains unclear. Without any general agreement as to the nature of a
"legitimate" secessionist movement, the international community will have
a hard time determining whether a Quebec claim to secessionist self-deter-
mination would be a legitimate one or not.' 90
In the end, Quebec is no better off now than it was before negotiations
began. A new prime minister, one without alternative solutions, will not
likely change anything. Other than the status quo, Quebecers are left only
with the option to leave the federation-an option which could quite possibly
leave them in a much worse position internationally. Thus far Canadians
have fought this battle together. The end result though, will be up to
Quebecers to decide.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps Canada was right to refuse Quebec the power it desired within the
federation; weakening the federal government may not have been good for
Canadian federalism. Ironically, though, Canada's very future is now in
Quebec's hands. The 1995 referendum will likely go on as planned, without
being postponed by yet another accord. Another constitutional package is
not entirely out of the question, however, especially if the new Prime
Minister wants to try his or her hand at the negotiating game. Nevertheless,
it will be difficult to muster the political will to go through this process
again, knowing that everything possible was done twice before, yet
187 id.
188 Stefaniuk, supra note 179.
's'Id.
'9 See BuCCHErr, supra note 71, at 216. According to Buccheit, a legitimate claim to
secessionist self-determination is one where the claimant has demonstrated that it is in fact
a self, and that secession would likely result in greater world harmony than would be the case
if the existing union were preserved. Id. at 228.
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constitutional reform was rejected.
Although not all Quebecers are die-hard separatists, few are content with
the status quo. In light of the two failed accords, many now view reform as
a non-viable option. For the next two years, separatists will be pitching
independence at the top of their lungs. This time, more Quebecers may be
willing to listen.
Susan Lavergne
